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The occasion to attend the Maryland Constitutionalism Schmooze on the topic of
religion and the Constitution (and the pressure associated with punching an “admissions
ticket”) has afforded me the chance to revisit one of my favorite books, Sandy Levinson’s
Constitutional Faith.1 Throughout the manuscript, and especially in the concluding
chapter, the author interrogates the self-conscious act of signing the text, the practice of
(re)affirming one’s fidelity to the original constitutional instrument by literally placing
pen to paper (parchment?) and publicly acknowledging acceptance. He recounts a story
in which he was asked to sign the Constitution during the celebrations surrounding the
document’s bicentennial, and his decision to sign was not without considerable anguish.2
What does it mean to pledge allegiance to the Constitution by “adding one’s name” to the
document, he asked? “How do we stand vis-à-vis the Constitution” when we are
encouraged to carry out the representational act of ratification? How can we turn a blind
eye to the startling inadequacies of the document? And yet how can we not endorse a
document that, for better or worse, changed the nature of ordered government throughout
the world?
Broadly speaking, Levinson’s story (and his dilemma) is intended to draw
attention to two related measures: the manner and the degree to which current American
citizens endorse the country’s constitutional charter. He is of course not alone in
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examining these theoretical ideas. Others have been curious about various modes or
methods of embracing the Constitution after the moment for formal ratification has
passed. The act of taking an oath has been scrutinized as a method of expressing
allegiance to the text. Public leaders, teachers, civil servants, and others regularly ask
American citizens to reengage in various ways with the spirit of the constitutional
document. Museums and exhibits have been built or installed that focus attention on the
importance of the Constitution. And, of course, scholars have long been fixated on the
text and the implications associated with contemporary approaches to ratification. Will
Harris was (and is) fascinated by a citizenry’s ongoing dialogue with the Constitution.3
More recently, Mariah Zeisberg asks whether citizens are engaged in a “new framing” by
virtue of the National Constitution Center’s interactive exhibits, including one that forces
us to confront directly the self-conscious act of signing.4
There are innumerable reasons why one might choose to sign or not sign—
symbolically ratify or reject—the Constitution; some are silly and some are genuinely
profound. Levinson draws our attention to several of the more common reasons: for
some, he says, adding one’s signature to the text represents a sense of duty or obligation,
a more or less uninformed commitment based on the assumption that support for the
principles at the center of America’s political experiment automatically signals support
for the nation’s fundamental law. The sentiment seems to be that the Constitution ought
to be ratified because it is symbolic of the virtues of a free and sovereign people. For
other signers, the Constitution represents a marvelous achievement in political
negotiation and diplomacy; it is a compromise, to be sure, but it is also a hopeful,
inspirational, and even majestic document worthy of esteem.
On the other hand, there are very significant reasons to reject the Constitution,
says Levinson. It implicitly or explicitly perpetuated the institution of chattel slavery; it
did not recognize a significant portion of the American population; several of its clauses
and provisions are now outdated, and so on. In his most recent book, Our Undemocratic
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Constitution, Professor Levinson continues his inquiry into the usefulness and value of
our current constitutional document, claiming that after a lifetime of reflection he has
decided now to “reject the invitation to re-sign the Constitution.”5 Citing the
“inadequacies” of the Constitution today, and the inability of American citizens to engage
meaningfully with the document (and with the conception of constitutions more
generally), Levinson suggests now is the time to abandon this particular charter and
summon a new Constitutional Convention.
Embedded within these and other discussions about support for the Constitution,
and about the self-conscious act of signing the document, the term “reverence” inevitably
appears. Indeed, the constitutional text is so ubiquitous in the history of the United
States, and even in the history of constitutionalism around the world, that it is not
foolhardy to assume that this particular charter is worthy of such high esteem.
Veneration for the Constitution, or at least the idea of the Constitution, commenced long
ago, and by some pretty prominent figures. There are hints throughout the Federalist
Papers—especially in those penned by James Madison—that the success of the
constitutional order depends on a healthy veneration for the text.6 Half a century after
Madison, Abraham Lincoln spoke of reverence to the Constitution and the law as a
necessary feature of regime stability. Presidents from Washington to Obama have
spoken eloquently about reverence for the constitutional instrument. Recently, the
National Constitution Center surveyed citizens and asked about the various levels of their
commitment to the Constitution, suggesting in some cases that respect for the text borders
on awe. David M. Kennedy, the eminent Stanford historian, even goes so far as to say
about the American Constitution: “It is our most fundamental political document,
reverenced by all, the supposed cement of our society…”7 Sandy Levinson, of course,
laments the unreflective veneration or reverence for the constitutional text, but even he
has to admit that the sentiment is out there among America’s citizens. Siding decidedly
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with Thomas Jefferson, who believed that constitutional texts were not to be revered and
were to be rewritten every generation, Levinson in fact argues that the first step to
constitutional renewal is for Americans to “overcome” our curious reverence for the
constitutional charter.
To suggest that the Constitution is worthy of reverence is to suggest that it merits
special, heightened, even religious, status. Presumably, those who revere the text
worship its many clauses, provisions, aspirations, and rights protections. Doubtless, they
also revere the broad contours of the Constitution’s fundamental message(s) and, more
generally, how those messages continue to inform the political and constitutional
dialogue both at home and around the world. Americans are proud of their constitutional
charter (even if they can’t tell us what it says) and they are impressed by its longevity and
brevity. Moreover, they believe certain parts of the text are truly special. The Preamble,
for example, resonates with an American citizenry sophisticated enough to understand the
aspirational character of a constitutional instrument. The self-referential quality of the
Preamble’s linguistic style,8 combined with its tangible promises of liberty, security, and
justice, dovetail nicely with the widely respected (and revered?) language of the
Declaration of Independence. More evidently, the Bill of Rights has come to represent
the heart of the constitutional text, and in a society infatuated with personal liberty the
reality that a list of freedoms is perceived as the cornerstone of the document will likely
elevate that document to reverential standing. To be sure, the Bill of Rights has, in many
ways, eclipsed the original constitutional document in the minds and hearts of the
American populace. As I’ve written elsewhere, “both literally and figuratively, the
constitution’s role in organizing various political institutions is now overshadowed by the
perception that the text’s first priority is to identify and protect individual rights.”9 When

8

Akhil Amar put this point most accurately. He writes, “The Constitution, after all, was
not just a text, but an act—a doing, a constituting. In the Preamble’s performative
utterance, “We the people…do” alter the old and ordain and establish the new.” Akhil
Reed Amar. The Bill of Rights: Creation and Reconstruction (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1998), p. 27.
9
Beau Breslin. From Words to Worlds: Exploring Constitutional Functionality
(Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2009), p. 83. In addition, just this past
week, The Washington Post reported that several Latin American countries are
undergoing “document driven revolutions”—constitutional “re-foundings,” the
4

asked by the National Constitution Center what the U.S. Constitution “means to them,”
more than half of the individuals surveyed responded that the document is all about
“freedom” and that it establishes the institutional “basis of our rights.” These two
responses were, by far, the most prominent in the entire poll. Many Americans revere the
Constitution, but (unsurprisingly) even more revere it because it is seen as the vehicle
that protects individual freedom and liberty.
To revere is to “regard with feelings of profound respect, to consider something
hallowed or exalted, or to be in awe of it.”10 One can revere something secular, but the
quality or character of respect that accompanies reverence and veneration is usually
reserved for the sacred texts of the world’s major religions (almost every formal
definition of “reverence,” “veneration,” and “sacred,” includes some reference to
religion). Not mere endorsement or affirmation, reverence connotes a deeper, more
profound commitment to the item or instrument respected. The definition of reverence is
tied up with the principle of faith, a largely unconfirmed (and unconfirmable) belief in
the greatness of an object, text, person, or idea. For example, certain people might revere
the word of God or the power of nature, and if they do, they cherish those things as
sacred. As noted, many revere the Constitution for what it says and what it represents,
and thus they too view that particular text as hallowed.
The Constitution’s reverential status raises a host of questions, including ones
focused on the relationship between sacred texts and amendability: If the Constitution is
so worthy of reverence—if it is, as many have suggested, sacred—should it also be
alterable? If it is a hallowed institution, meriting the type of veneration typically reserved
for religious tomes and teachings, should we be so at ease about the prospect of
fundamental and radical structural change, especially if we imagine that the power to
alter the constitutional document is so considerable that the text could conceivably be
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altered entirely out of existence?11 If the Constitution is sacred, shouldn’t it also be
sacrosanct? Here, I’m specifically referring to the formal power granted in Article V to
amend the text, and not the ability by the judiciary or other institutions to interpret the
Constitution in ways that fundamentally change its meaning. Article V grants authority
to various institutions—including the Congress and the state legislatures—to propose
amendments to the Constitution or to call conventions for the purpose of proposing
amendments to said text. The authority to alter small sections or large chunks of the
constitutional document is embedded within the document itself; the rules for
amendment, that is, are outlined in the text itself. This authority is a direct consequence
of the Framers’ Enlightenment beliefs, particularly in, 1) the imperfectability of human
nature and, 2) the “new science of politics.”12
Of course, some will claim that the amendment process is itself one of the
reverential features of the American Constitution. The capacity to change the document
through addition is a crucial mechanism aimed at constitutional maintenance, and without
it the Constitution becomes far less esteemed (and probably unworkable). Along with the
capacity to interpret the text in different historical moments and within different historical
contexts, the ability to alter the document formally is what allows the text to stay current
or timely. Interestingly, Stephen Holmes, Cass Sunstein, and others have further insisted
that the perennial temporal problem faced by all constitutional regimes—namely, that a
contemporary democratic people agree to live by rules and procedures established by a
past generation of people—can be offset, at least in part, by the capacity to amend the
text. Holmes insists that amendability is one antidote for the problem of
precommitment.13
Even still, the power of amendment represents a curious and possibly disquieting
component of a revered text. If we take seriously the various functions and features of a
constitution, and we are willing admit that the articles, provisions, and clauses that give
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meaning to those features are truly sacred, what does it say about our commitment to a
document that includes an internal mechanism for eliminating or altering those exact
articles, provisions, and clauses? What does it mean to admit to the imperfectability of
the Constitution at the same time that we classify the document as blessed? Can a
constitution be imperfect and still sacred?14 Is there an inherent paradox here? Jefferson
was curious about a similar line of inquiry, and his response was to discourage the
continued veneration of the present Constitution, to take it off of its pedestal: “some men
look at constitutions with sanctimonious reverence,” he said, “and deem them like the arc
of the covenant, too sacred to be touched.”15 For Jefferson, reverence should be reserved
for other types of texts.
Certainly not an exact analogy, but the sacred religious texts—the Bible, the
Koran, the four Vedas of Hinduism, and so on—do not similarly allow for radical
alterations, at least not in any formal sense.16 It is true that they differ from the
Constitution in several important respects. Most believers, for instance, view sacred
religious texts as “divinely or supernaturally inspired;” only some see the product of
Philadelphia’s constitutional convention as “miraculous” in a similar sense. Additionally,
sacred religious texts serve fundamentally different purposes and appeal to different
audiences than constitutions. These religious texts were not necessarily written as
practical documents, nor were they inspired by enlightenment principles and a healthy
respect for science and rationality.
And yet there are certain similarities in the way in which all of these secular and
non-secular documents are described, exalted, and admired. Sacred religious texts are
defined as such because they order the lives of believers, they provide moral and ethical
guideposts by which individual followers measure their particular actions. Constitutions
order lives too. Ceremonies and rituals separate sacred religious texts from the ordinary;
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constitutions spawn a whole host of ceremonies and rituals (consider the role of oaths).
Sacred religious texts often tell a story, a narrative that acts as metaphor for the teachings
of the particular sect. More and more frequently, newly framed constitutions begin by
describing—often in narrative form—those events that gave rise to the need for
constitutional renewal. Religious texts inspire, comfort, influence, motivate, encourage,
and so on. Their sacredness, in fact, stems primarily from their ability to inspire and
elevate the human condition. The U.S. Constitution is inspirational to many. Sacred
religious texts were written at a particular point in time and they reflect the ideas and
prejudices of that moment. So are constitutions. Part of the success of a sacred religious
text is due to its longevity and stability; indeed, most of the sacred religious texts are
hundreds or even thousands of years old. The success of the American constitutional
charter is also due in part to its enduring quality.
What is interesting (to me at least) is that these sacred religious teachings don’t
include passages analogous to Article V that suggest the presence of imperfections. More
to the point, they don’t automatically invite the possibility of amendment. Make no
mistake: these documents have changed over time. It is customary, for example, to view
the Gospels as representing some form of biblical amendments; they are, after all,
revisions of the narrative surrounding Christ’s life and teachings. Karen Armstrong, a
widely respected biographer of the Bible, is helpful here. She insists that edits, changes,
and alterations have been made to both the Old and New Testaments for thousands of
years, usually to reflect the political or cultural concerns of the period. Recounting one
of those early moments, she writes:
It would be many years before Yahwism became a religion of the book.
The exiles had brought a number of scrolls from the royal archive in
Jerusalem with them to Babylon and there they studied and edited these
documents. If they were allowed to return home, these records of the
history and cult of their people could play an important role in the
restoration of national life. But the scribes did not regard these writings as
sacrosanct and felt free to add new passages, altering them to fit their
changed circumstances. They had as yet no notion of a sacred text.17
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The practice of editing, uniting, and altering the biblical narrative, Armstrong
contends, continued until the nineteenth century, when a movement emerged that called
for the literal interpretation of the text. Before then, few could have even conceived of a
literal reading; part of the tradition of oral history is that the storyteller is granted certain
license to infuse modifications. After the emergence of this group of literalists, though,
few edits or changes have even been suggested. In fact, the call for a literal interpretation
of the Bible seems to coincide perfectly with the ceasing of modifications altogether.
Those who advocate a literal translation of the Bible have, in a sense, won an important
battle: they’ve locked down the text and prevented the possibility of radical or tangible
revisions.18 The Bible has been mostly unchanged for close to two hundred years now.
That particular moment in the nineteenth century, therefore, helped to solidify the belief
that the stories captured in the Bible, once textualized, were somehow sacred and
unalterable.
No doubt other religious documents include similar histories; they too have been
altered through the years and they too have taken on reverential status once in written
form. And yet the ability to modify what is printed in the text is neither announced in
these religious tracts, nor is the formal mechanism for fundamental change viewed as one
of the principal virtues of the entire document. These documents are sacrosanct;
believers celebrate the solidity of their governing text. The Constitution, in contrast, is
only sacrosanct in spirit. Its broad contours and its central messages may be sacred (and
that may be enough to satisfy most), but its particulars remain subject to review. In the
end, perhaps that is what most distinguishes constitutions from certain revered religious
manuscripts.
Which brings me back to the self-conscious act of signing the Constitution.
Accompanied by my daughter, I too found myself recently in Signers’ Hall of the
National Constitution Center confronted with Sandy Levinson’s principal dilemma:
should I ratify the text, warts and all? Do I lend my signature to a document that I
believe has changed the world, but has also not always lived up to its promise? Do I
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revere this text, or is it just the idea of the constitutional charter that stirs my emotions?
Is this Constitution sacred to me? Is it worthy of reverence?
Spending a career thinking about the theory of constitutionalism and the
importance of constitutions did not make the decision any easier. My daughter, Molly,
eagerly signed (claiming something about just wanting to “get out of the museum to find
ice cream”), but I was not so sure. To symbolically ratify or reject the constitutional
instrument was a far more profound and difficult decision than I anticipated. As it turned
out, it was precisely the imperfectability of the constitutional text that inclined me toward
ratification. After acknowledging that the act of signing (as well as the physical
environment of Signers’ Hall) has itself become part of the ceremony and ritual that
renders the Constitution sacred, I could admit that the Constitution’s revered status is
probably just a social construction. The idea of a constitution of this sort was enough for
me, even if I share Sandy Levinson’s view that this particular charter is chock full of
inadequacies. What the Constitution stood for, and its enduring potential, I concluded,
rendered it sacred.
As such, Benjamin Franklin probably captures my sentiments on the issue most
accurately. At the close of the Constitutional Convention, the elder statesman addressed
General Washington and his fellow delegates and admitted to many doubts about what
they had just accomplished. Too weak to stand and speak, his friend and fellow
Pennsylvanian James Wilson read his remarks. They probably represent the thoughts of
many at the time; what is more, they probably represent the thoughts of just as many
today.
I confess that there are several parts of this constitution which I do
not at present approve, but I am not sure I shall never approve them; for
having lived long, I have experienced many instances of being obliged by
better information, or fuller consideration, to change opinions even on
important subjects, which I once thought right, but found to be otherwise.
It is therefore that the older I grow, the more apt I am to doubt my own
judgment, and to pay more respect to the judgment of others…In these
sentiments, Sir, I agree to this Constitution with all its faults, if they are
such; because I think a general Government necessary for us...I doubt too
whether any other Convention we can obtain, may be able to make a better
Constitution.
Thus I consent, Sir, to this Constitution because I expect no better,
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and because I am not sure, that it is not the best. On the whole, I can not
help expressing a wish that every member of the Convention who may still
have objections to it, would with me, on this occasion doubt a little of his
own infallibility, and to make manifest our unanimity, put his name to this
instrument.
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